











The UK’s approach to cross-border insolvencies is likely to face a number of 
challenges when it leaves the EU in the next few years. At the point of Brexit, should 
there be a clean break away from the EU legal frameworks, the UK will have to be 
prepared to address any shortcomings that may occur. As a priority, it would be in 
the interest of the UK to remain party to a number of cross-border agreements in 
order to protect its commercial and financial position in Europe. To ensure that this 
could be achieved, much would need to be made of the UK’s relationship with the 
other member states of the EU. This would be vital since the success and 
predictability of cross-border insolvencies rely heavily on the legal cooperation 
between the member states, along with each country providing recognition of 
proceedings to allow an orderly cross-border insolvency system. It is therefore 
imperative that the UK takes preliminary steps to explore the impact that Brexit 
could have on cross-border insolvency law.  
To this end, the article will consist of three parts. First, the existing legal framework 
will be explored to identify the relevant issues that would need to be addressed in 
any future cross-border model. Second, the influences that have helped to shape the 
law will be explored to determine whether the challenges that face the UK post-
Brexit could be adequately addressed. Third, the article will address some of the 
challenges that the UK could face before proposing recommendations.  
 
Introduction 
The UK’s impending exit from the European Union raises a number of important 
questions concerning the impact that this would have on cross-border transactions 
and resultant legal proceedings.1 The current position relating to cross-border 
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proceedings is complex in nature, as it is often an issue in both identifying which 
law would be applicable, and the ability to foresee any subsequent legal 
proceedings.2 The complexities are often further enhanced by the lack of detail 
pertaining the level of recognition (relating to legal proceedings) that would apply 
to the UK after it leaves the EU.  
As the UK looks to negotiate its exit and determine what laws will apply post-Brexit, 
it is worth noting that over the last few years all the member states within the EU 
have seen the continued development of national insolvency rules and regulations. 
However, despite the growth in national insolvency laws it is evident that English 
insolvency and restructuring procedures remain highly regarded in Europe.3 Besides 
sometimes being able to offer a more favourable legal position, English insolvency 
law provides a highly flexible, comprehensive restructuring toolkit that can adapt 
according to circumstances, and when warranted, it can rely on the commercial 
knowledge of the judiciary for input.4 In selecting a preferred legal framework, it 
remains common practice for creditors who provide funds to a foreign company to 
dictate the law that they wish to apply. This can be achieved through a variety of 
methods, such as the creditor stating the legal jurisdiction to govern a contract, or by 
the creditor shifting the centre of main interests (“COMI”) to the UK.5 The practice 
of preferring UK insolvency law has led to aspects of the English insolvency 
procedures being afforded wide recognition across Europe. Such recognition has 
ensured that the influence of English insolvency procedures remain extensive, a 
position that has provided a stable and predictable system for commercial parties to 
rely upon when structuring cross-border deals and making investment decisions.6  
Until Brexit has been fully realised it will not be clear what the impact on the 
recognition of UK proceedings abroad will be. However, what is clear is that 
irrespective of the UK’s post-Brexit deal, the legal landscape in which cross-border 
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also encouraged some European companies to move operations to the UK immediately prior to a formal 
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insolvencies occur will have continued to evolve.7 Many changes can be credited to 
a number of key EU dictated polices,8 which will likely be exacerbated rather than 
limited by Brexit. While it will be many years before the actual impact of Brexit can 
be fully determined, the potential threat that it could deter creditors from using 
English insolvency and restructuring procedures should encourage the UK to 
proactively consider its options.9 
The purpose of this article is to examine the UK and its post-Brexit response to cross-
border insolvencies. The article will consist of four parts. First, the pre-Brexit 
landscape will be explored to highlight the current legal framework that applies to 
the UK, and what challenges the UK would likely have to address post-Brexit. 
Second, the different approaches to cross-border insolvency will be examined to 
highlight the conflicts that exist between territoriality and universalism, and how the 
influence of both have shaped cross-border insolvency law. This would lead onto the 
third part of the article which will explore the rule of law and the implications that 
path-dependency could have on the UK future cross-border insolvency law. Part four 
of the article will address some of the challenges by proposing recommendations.  
The Pre-Brexit Position and the Challenges Ahead  
The UK has three main provisions for cross-border cooperation in insolvency 
matters. They are: the EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings,10 the UNCITRAL 
Model law, and section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986. In addition to these strands, 
the common law remains relevant and has in recent years steadily grown in 
importance due to a number of high profile decisions in both the UK Supreme Court 
and Privy Council. These cases have offered valuable guidance on cross-border 
insolvency at common law and, in particular, the limits of common law judicial 
assistance in respect of foreign insolvency proceedings.11  
As cross-border insolvency law continues to evolve, by the time Brexit is realised 
there will have been a number of changes to the legal landscape. In terms of how 
significant these changes will be depends on whether the UK decides to divert away 
from the legal framework contained in the European Insolvency Regulation - 
Regulation 1346/2000, the provisions of which have now been amended by the 
‘recast’ Regulation  - Regulation 2015/848.12 For the purposes of this article the 
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importance of the Recast regulation will be limited since it would only apply where 
a debtor has its COMI in the EU.13 Should the debtor have its COMI in the UK after 
Brexit, and no provisions have been taken to address this as an exception, then as the 
law stands the EIR would cease to apply. The strands relevant to the pre-Brexit 
position, and the challenges that they may face, will now be examined.  
“Recast” Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (“EIR Recast”)  
For a number of years the key EU legislation on cross-border insolvency was the EC 
Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 1346/2000 (“EIR”).14 The recast Regulation 
on Insolvency Proceedings 2015/848 (“EIR Recast”) came into force on 26 June 
2017, modernising the scope of the EIR by, amongst other things, bringing pre-
insolvency “rescue” procedures within its remit.15 In addition to the EIR Recast, 
other European legal instruments of relevance that have influenced the cross-border 
position include: the Financial Collateral Directive,16 the Insurers Winding Up 
Directive17 and the Credit Institutions Winding Up Directive.18 Beyond the 
legislative frameworks that these directives have implemented, what they have 
demonstrated is that the EU has steadily addressed the elusive rule of law concept 
that often operates in the context of “national legal orders”, to instead apply to 
different legal systems.19 To suggest that legal pluralism can exist on a transnational 
basis is not a stretch too far when it is realised that within most national legal orders, 
pluralism in some form or another exists. On that basis, cross-border insolvency law 
is no different. By embracing legal pluralism it provides for consistent and 
predictable rules that can exist within different legal systems, even if the consistency 
in the substantive rules themselves do not exist.20  
As legal pluralism permits national laws to co-exist, different member states will 
have their own insolvency laws that apply on a national and transnational basis, with 
the latter designed to reflect the transactions and stakeholder requirements within the 
wider commercial and financial market.21 The differences can be tolerated to take 
into account a wide variety of factors including national laws, culture and customs, 
but this would be on the basis that the common purpose of cross-border insolvency 
could be realised. It is therefore imperative that the insolvency practices of a country 
are relevant and applicable to market expectations. If  this is not the case it is highly 
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15 For an overview of the of the original European Commission recommendations for reform for the 
Regulation, see Proposal for a new regulation COM (2012) 744, and see also Report from the Commission 
on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29th May 2000 on insolvency 
proceedings, COM (2012) 744. 
16 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial 
collateral arrangements. 
17 See Directive 2009/138/EC Risk management and supervision of insurance companies (Solvency 2). 
18 Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 April 2001 on the 
reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions. 
19 Rijpkema (n 7) 168; Deane and Mason (n 7) 139. 
20 Deane and Mason (n 7) 139. 
21 J Westbrook, ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default’ (2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2276, 2283. 
    
likely that this position would not only isolate the jurisdiction in question, but it 
would deter creditors from investing in businesses in that jurisdiction. 
Under EIR Recast, recognition is reciprocal and automatic in nature so the UK as a 
member state within the EU has the benefit that allows its insolvency practitioners 
to quickly and easily take control of, and realise, an insolvent company’s assets that 
are situated in another EU country. This is reflective of market practices and one that 
promotes the rule of law concept across the member states. The EIR Recast, by 
embracing legal pluralism while respecting national rules, has brought into line 
common insolvency law practices. The impact of this has constrained the UK courts 
to open insolvency proceedings in respect of a debtor, and it has established uniform 
rules on both jurisdictions to open insolvency proceedings and the choice of law that 
applies in respect of those proceedings. The choice of law has often correlated with 
where the debtor has its COMI, and the secondary proceedings have been opened 
where the debtor has its “establishment”.22 In practice this can often be manipulated 
by a process known as “forum shopping”, which involves a creditor choosing a 
preferred legal system that may be more favourable to the them should the company 
become insolvent.23 While there are good and bad practices associated with forum 
shopping,24 the EIR Recast has done more to enhance rather than eradicate the 
practice.25 
Since the UK is generally seen as a good place to “shop”,26 if the UK was to 
relinquish its recognition, whether intentional or not, the post-Brexit position would 
likely lead to the UK to revert back to the pre-EIR Recast model. As this outcome 
would be undesirable since it has the potential to undermine the UK’s strong position 
as a leader in cross-border insolvencies, a compromise would likely be struck with 
other member states that permits the UK to rely on some pre-Brexit case law that 
has since become part of the common law.27  
If a compromise is not possible, and the UK loses its automatic recognition, the UK 
would find its relationship with other EU member states win cross-border insolvency 
cases dramatically altered. A change in position would mean court applications 
would be required in each jurisdiction where assets belonging to the insolvent party 
were situated. The application would ask the court to recognise their authority to act 
and to represent the insolvent company, and then give leave to apply for permission 
                                                 
22 EIR Recast art.3(2). For a discussion on “establishment”, see J Wood, ‘The Meaning of “Economic 
Activity” and “Establishment” in Cross-border Insolvency Proceedings – the Implications of Olympic 
Airlines SA case’ (2015) 9 ICCLR 302. 
23 See generally M Szydlo, ‘Prevention of Forum Shopping in European Insolvency Law’ (2010) 11 
EBOR 253; W G Ringe, ‘Forum Shopping Under the EU Insolvency Regulation’ (2008) 9 EBOR 579; G 
McCormack, ‘Jurisdictional Competition and Forum Shopping in Insolvency Proceedings’ (2009) 68 CLJ 
213. 
24 See, Re Codere Finance (UK) LTD [2015] EWHC 3778 (Ch), para 18. 
25 McCormack and Anderson (n 11) 536. 
26 See, the scheme of arrangement (and pre-packaged administration) for Wind Hellas 
Telecommunications SA, a Luxembourg company which relocated its head office to London in order to 
make use of English restructuring mechanisms. For a detailed overview of forum shopping see J Payne, 
‘Cross-border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping’ (2013) 14(4) EBOR 563. 
27 See below.  
  
to repatriate their assets. Such a process could be costly and time consuming and if 
this were to occur it would likely act as a deterrent to securing investment for UK 
based companies, in addition to companies strategically placing their European 
COMI outside of the UK.  
While the UK will be the obvious focus of any Brexit discussion, cross-border 
insolvencies naturally involve other jurisdictions. The implications of Brexit should 
therefore involve a discussion concerning other jurisdictions and the requirement of 
their insolvency practitioners, should assets reside in the UK, to apply to the UK for 
recognition. Foreign insolvency proceedings seeking recognition in the UK would 
have to rely on section 426 Insolvency Act 1986, the common law, and the Cross-
border Insolvency Regulation 2006 (“CBIR”), which in comparison to the EIR 
Recast are limited in scope. As such, it would in the interest of all member states to 
address this issue as a matter of priority.  
Recognition, and the Enforcement of Orders and Judgements   
Following Brexit, recognition, and the enforcement of orders and judgments made 
and given in foreign insolvency proceedings will no longer be automatic where those 
proceedings are being conducted in an EU member state.28 Instead, the UK may have 
to rely on other avenues to secure recognition, finding assistance in the following 
provisions. 
The Common Law Doctrine of Modern Universalism  
This doctrine allows for recognition and assistance, but not the enforcement of orders 
and judgments.29 The application of this approach would be limited since it would 
not be able to assist with outbound UK cases post-Brexit (apart from in another 
jurisdiction applying the common law). Much will depend on the EU and the 
importance it places on the UK remaining part of the cross-border agreement. Should 
the EU not afford the UK with its current level of recognition, then this could 
undermine the UK’s ability to portray itself as a key influencer when it comes to 
cross-border insolvencies.  
Cross Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 
The Cross Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (“CBIR”)30 implemented the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, which provided a framework 
for recognition made by a foreign representative of a debtor with its COMI or an 
establishment in the foreign jurisdiction.31 While the Regulations provide for 
                                                 
28 For a discussion on foreign insolvency proceedings, see N Segal, J Harris, and M Morrison, ‘Assistance 
to Foreign Insolvency Office-holders in the Conflict of Laws: is the Common Law Fit for Purpose?’ 
(2017) 30(8) Insolv Int 117. 
29 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46; Singularis Holdings Ltd v PrincewaterhouseCoopers [2014] 
UKPC 36. 
30 The Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1030). 
31 The CBIR apply without the need for reciprocity (which means, for example, that the UK will recognise 
eligible Chinese insolvency proceedings even if China has not itself enacted the Model Law). However, 
the EIR Recast prevails if the other country is an EU Member State. Like the EIR Recast, the CBIR do 
not apply to certain types of entities including credit institutions, insurance companies etc. The Model 
    
recognition and the giving of assistance, it does not provide for the enforcement of 
insolvency-related orders and judgments. Some valid arguments have been made for 
the expansion of the relief available under the Regulations (for example, in relation 
to the enforcement of insolvency-related judgments32 and the application of foreign 
law),33 though this is not because of Brexit.34 The CBIR, given its application, would 
remain in place regardless and would be available in support of EU insolvency 
proceedings. This position would also be desirable from a consistency point of view 
in that the Model articles, or at least provisions that closely follow the articles, are 
widely endorsed and therefore compliance would promote a model that is understood 
on an international basis. With this in mind, the UK would do well not to depart from 
the terms of the Model Law for this reason. To do so would also run the risk of 
alienating member states with a Brexit model that would merely strive to facilitate 
recognition and acting in aid of (among others) UK proceedings. While CBIR could 
continue to offer the UK with a solution post-Brexit, the limited endorsement of the 
CBIR35 would suggest that more viable options would be reviewed first. 
Section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
In comparison to the CBIR, an alternative option would be to consider section 426 
of the Insolvency Act 1986. This section enables any court in the UK to assist those 
courts with corresponding insolvency jurisdiction in any other part of the UK or any 
relevant country or territory, and to apply comparable insolvency law applicable by 
either court.36 The number of territories that section 426 applies to is wider than those 
under the CBIR, and they include: the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, the Republic 
of Ireland and a number of Commonwealth and former Commonwealth members 
whose laws are based on the common law, some of which have similar provisions to 
assist courts in the UK.37 In terms of how the section is applied, requests for 
assistance must come from foreign courts rather than directly from foreign 
officeholders, and as such, speed and consistency in the usage of this section will 
vary considerably. However, the flexibility of this provision means that it could be 
                                                 
Law has, to date, been adopted in Australia, Canada, Colombia, Eritrea, Greece, Japan, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, 
United Kingdom, British Virgin Islands and the United States of America. 
32 In Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46; [2013] AC 236, it was held that the provisions of the 
Model Law authorising the grant of discretionary relief in respect of foreign insolvency proceedings did 
not provide a basis for overturning long-established common law principles governing the enforcement 
of foreign monetary judgments. 
33 This would deal with some of the issues thrown up by Re Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2014] EWHC 2124 (Ch); 
[2014] Bus LR 1041.  
34 McCormack and Anderson (n 11) 552. 
35 Which include Greece, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the UK (including Gibraltar). 
36 Case law on s426 shows that, although the court has a discretion regarding whether to provide 
assistance, and in what form, the general rule is that the court should provide assistance unless there are 
powerful reasons not to, see England v Smith [2001] Ch 419; Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance 
Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852; Singularis Holdings Limited v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36. 
37 The full list of designated countries includes: Anguilla, Australia, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Botswana, 
Brunei, Canada, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Guernsey (modified), Gibraltar, Hong Kong, the 
Republic of Ireland, Malaysia, Montserrat, New Zealand, South Africa, St Helena, Turks and Caicos 
Islands, Tuvalu and the Virgin Islands 
  
amended to accommodate issues that arise out of Brexit, but as it stands the scope of 
section 426 is limited to the jurisdictions in which it currently can be applied. 
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 
The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 applies to the judgments 
of the courts of certain listed countries (which for example include Australia, 
Guernsey, India and parts of Canada), but as it is bilateral in nature it is limited in 
scope.38 While in theory the UK could utilise this Act in cross-border insolvencies 
should it lose its in-bound recognition from other jurisdictions, it is likely to prefer 
a legal framework that can offer a wider scope in terms of application and 
enforcement.  
Common Law 
The English courts may assist overseas officeholders under common law principles 
but this does not assist in any way with reciprocal recognition of English 
proceedings.39 Although not in itself an insolvency procedure falling within the 
ambit of the EIR Recast, the English courts have accepted jurisdiction in approving 
schemes of arrangement under the Companies Act 2006.40 This would relate to 
overseas debtors where there is a sufficient connection with English law in 
circumstances where a scheme would be recognised by another EU member state in 
which the debtor has its COMI.41  
Common law could be useful in the absence of any other treaty or convention, to 
govern the enforcement of the orders of foreign courts. Given that there is extensive 
case law dealing with common law principles governing judicial assistance in 
insolvency matters and the recognition of foreign insolvency judgments, there is 
much literature to refer to.42 How the principles have been applied over the years has 
gradually changed, with the more expansive interpretation seeing a decline.43 
However, some concepts like ensuring fairness between creditors have remained of 
paramount importance. To this end, the courts have used its wide discretion to 
provide assistance to a foreign insolvency proceeding by doing whatever was 
considered to be just and appropriate in all the circumstances of the particular case, 
                                                 
38 The leading case on the foreign law enforcement judgment is Jimmy Wayne Adams and others v Cape 
Industries pIc and Capasco Limited [1990] 2 WLR 657.  
39 The common law sit alongside the CBIR and they are often seen pleaded as alternative grounds of 
relief. There is debate about whether the common law also sits alongside s426 (because the House of 
Lords was split on this issue in Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852). 
However, within the EU the EC Regulation ordinarily applies to the exclusion of the common law. 
40 The Scheme of Arrangement will be discussed below. 
41 See Re Global Garden Products Italy SpA [2016] EWHC 1884 (Ch). Under s.895(2) of the Companies 
Act 2006, the court had jurisdiction to sanction a scheme in relation to any company liable to be wound 
up under the Insolvency Act 1986; that extended to a foreign company, see Re Van Gansewinkel Groep 
BV [2015] WEHC 2151 (Ch), [2015] Bus. L.R. 1046.  
42 Cases often, but not exclusively, feature from offshore jurisdictions such as the Isle of Man, the Cayman 
Islands and the British Virgin Islands (BVI). 
43 Lord Hoffman referred to the principle of modified universalism as the "golden thread" running through 
English cross-border insolvency law since the 18th century, see Re HIG Casualty and General Insurance 
Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852 HL at [30]. 
    
to the extent that the court could do so in a domestic insolvency.44 The narrow 
interpretation has highlighted the limits of common law judicial power, and in one 
case it was held that it did not have a common law power to assist foreign liquidators 
by exercising powers analogous to those that would have been exercisable in a 
domestic insolvency, but which did not apply to a cross-border insolvency.45 
Nonetheless, with common law recognising English law schemes this has been 
useful in effecting restructurings of EU incorporated companies,46 and the schemes 
have continued to grow in importance.47 
Scheme of Arrangement after Brexit  
It would be expected that Brexit would have a limited impact on the popularity of 
the English scheme of arrangement since the scheme falls outside of the EIR Recast. 
As a “rescue” mechanism it operates as a European restructuring tool and the 
jurisdictional barriers would be easily overcome since the approval of a scheme 
would be satisfied if there was a “sufficient connection” with England and Wales, 
and English law governed agreements would suffice for this purpose. While the 
schemes may continue in popularity, the difficulties arise with determining whether 
the scheme falls within Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 (“Recast Brussels Regulation”) 
and therefore benefit from EU-wide recognition under that Regulation.48 Should the 
Recast Brussels Regulation cease to apply to the UK post-Brexit the level of 
recognition afforded to the UK from foreign jurisdictions would likely be heavily 
diminished. However, in the unlikely situation should the Recast Brussels 
Regulation continue to apply it will have to address some concerns as to whether the 
scheme of arrangement would favour the domestic laws of member states. The 
European Commission has recently published a proposal for a Restructuring 
Directive49 suggesting new restructuring possibilities on a pan-European basis which 
would enhance the chances that foreign companies would "shop locally" for 
restructuring procedures rather than prefer the scheme evident in the UK. To this 
                                                 
44 See Cambridge Gas Transport Corp v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator 
Holdings Plc [2007] 1 AC 508 (PC) (Isle of Man) at [16].   
45 See Singularis Holdings v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36; [2015] AC 1675 at [108]. 
46 See Re Metinvest BV [2017] EWHC 178 (Ch), which involved a company incorporated in the 
Netherlands. Two classes of creditors under a proposed scheme of arrangement were not fractured by a 
lock-up agreement under which the class members agreed to vote in favour of the scheme of arrangement 
in exchange for a small payment from the company; In Re DTEK Finance Plc [2016] EWHC 3562 (Ch); 
[2017] B.C.C. 165 the court declined to decide whether Regulation 1215/2012 applied to schemes of 
arrangement. It commented that when assessing whether it was "expedient" for claims to be heard 
together, the relevant factors included more than the number of creditors domiciled in the jurisdiction and 
the value of the debts they held, they also included the number of creditors who had submitted to the 
jurisdiction and the desirability of binding all scheme creditors to the same restructuring.  
47 See generally, J Payne, Schemes of Arrangement; Theory, Structure and Operation (CUP 2014). 
48 Council Regulation 44/2001 (“Brussles Regulation”) was superseded by the similar, but not identical 
Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 (recast) (“Recast Brussels Regulation”), and came into force January 2015. 
Collectively, the ‘judgment regulations’ to which they are sometimes referred to have largely replaced 
the Brussels Convention 1968, which only remains relevant in relation to matters concerning dependent 
territories of Brussel Convention countries.  
49 See generally G McCormack, ‘Business Restructuring Law in Europe: Making a Fresh Start’ (2017) 17 
JSCL 1; S Madaus, ‘The EU Recommendation on Business Rescue: Only Another Statement or a Cause 
for Legislative Action across Europe?’ (2014) 27 Insolv Int 81. 
  
end, member states may look to take advantage of the uncertainties that surround 
Brexit and replicate the same benefits as a UK scheme, but under another 
jurisdiction. While this could be an option, the actual application of such a scheme 
would be complex and much would depend on the professional, financial and 
judicial infrastructure to make such laws work in practice.50 For now the UK has in 
its favour a scheme of arrangement that is credible and proven, which offers 
reassurances to those wishing to rely on it. 
Brussels Recast Regulation: Automatic Recognition of Court Judgments  
The overall objective of the Brussels Recast Regulation is twofold. First, to simplify 
the formalities that govern reciprocal recognition, and second, to promote the 
interests of the harmonious administration of justice, to ensure that irreconcilable 
judgments will not be given in two EU states. Following on from the scheme of the 
arrangement it remains debateable as to whether they fall within the Brussels Recast 
Regulation and therefore benefit from EU-wide recognition under that Regulation. 
The EU and the UK have provided differing viewpoints on the matter, but what 
appears to be clear is that the position post-Brexit would mean that the Brussels 
Recast Regulation would unlikely apply to schemes.51 Invariably, such an outcome 
would lead to some confusion and questions would be raised concerning foreign 
companies and the jurisdiction that applies, as well as the recognition given to UK 
court-sanctioned schemes.52 To address the concern of the Brussels Recast 
Regulation becoming redundant, and the schemes losing its recognition, much 
reference has been made to the Lugano Convention.53 The UK is currently a party to 
the Lugano Convention through its membership of the EU which provides for a 
similar regime to that applicable under the Brussels Recast Regulation for the 
recognition and enforcement of judgements (except it applies to EU member states 
and European Free Trade Area states other than Liechtenstein). The position post-
Brexit would potentially allow for the UK to re-join the Lugano Convention, which 
would mitigate some of the challenges that the UK would face with the enforcement 
of schemes. Thereby a post-Brexit membership to the Lugano Convention could be 
highly desirable.   
Other Challenges Post-Brexit 
With regard to the challenges that the UK is likely to face post-Brexit, there are two 
issues that need to be addressed. First it would be highly likely that the remaining 
EU member states will explore ways to take advantage of the uncertainties caused 
by the UK’s position. Therefore, the UK would have to be mindful that it would need 
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to somehow retain the status quo, or create a legal framework that would allow 
business as usual. Second, and perhaps more difficult to assess, would be to 
determine what jurisdiction will the Court of Justice of the EU have after the UK 
leaves the EU. Each of the challenges will now be explored. 
Competition from other EU Member States 
Should the UK’s position differ substantially after Brexit, this could lead to 
uncertainty regarding the recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings since it 
would not be automatic where those proceedings are being conducted in an EU 
member state. From the UK’s perspective, while the UK has plenty of laws that 
enable the recognition and assistance of foreign proceedings, the cause for concern 
would be whether foreign courts would recognise UK proceedings abroad after 
Brexit. Should the lack of recognition significantly diminish, it is likely that the UK 
will face some serious competition from other EU member states, such as the 
Netherlands, who are in the process of presenting its revised restructuring regime 
that mimics the scheme of arrangement as a viable alternative for businesses who 
wish to continue to have a presence within the EU.54  
While opportunities will exist for the member states, they would need to consider 
the bigger picture and be mindful to not cause severe disruption to a system that has 
on the whole worked successfully. Therefore, it is likely that differences between 
member states will be kept to a minimum to avoid uncoordinated and inconsistent 
approaches adopted by different courts in different jurisdictions in a cross-border 
matter. Since the purpose of the UNCITRAL Model Law was to address such issues 
it is unlikely that the law would drastically change. However, what remains critical 
is the manner in which the laws would be applied and how the domestic courts would 
implement the insolvency proceedings. To address this concern, it has already been 
evident that steps have been taken recently in the courts of the British Virgin Islands 
joining the judiciaries from New York, Delaware, Singapore, Bermuda and the UK, 
in adopting guidelines for communication and cooperation amongst courts from 
different jurisdictions on cross-border insolvency matters.55 It therefore seems 
plausible that much flexibility will be granted to the UK to ensure that the overriding 
objective of maintaining certainty in insolvency proceedings is achieved.  
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”)   
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Should an agreement occur between the UK and the EU for the UK to retain its 
recognition, the next obstacle to overcome would be to determine how an EIR-like 
measure would operate without the possibility of recourse to the CJEU. While the 
discontinuance of the CJEU’s jurisdiction may be inconceivable it would appear 
paradoxical to the purpose of Brexit, should the CJEU continue to have jurisdiction 
over the UK to resolve disputes following the post-Brexit position.56 In addition, 
further reforms and judge-made decisions that would affect the EIR would also pose 
problems since the UK would be outside of the CJEU’s jurisdiction. In this case, it 
would be desirable. if such a compromise was possible, to devise a specific opt-in 
clause for the UK to remain part of the EIR, and should any cross-border conflict 
arise the UK could agree to allow the CJEU to resolve the dispute. Such a position 
is unlikely to be well received by the other member states, especially given that the 
EU has been careful not to offer favourable terms to deter other member states who 
may have been thinking about enacting their own exit from the EU.57 If a 
compromise were struck, how well this would work in practice, or even if such a 
proposal were tenable, would entirely depend on what could be negotiated.  
Given that Brexit will be a highly complex affair, it is unlikely that insolvency would 
be given priority over other commercial areas that would be deemed essential for 
trade. Nevertheless, should insolvency be granted priority status (or at least properly 
address as part of the UK’s wider commercial interests) the UK could be afforded 
with the opt-in clause. This would solve the issue of which court would have 
supremacy over EIR matters. However, while opt-in clauses may provide convenient 
respite for the UK’s position regarding EIR, it would likely impede the purpose of 
Brexit since it does not represent a clean break away from EU institutions. On the 
other hand, should a clean break with the CJEU occur, the UK would likely have to 
either follow, as much as possible, the case law that is decided in Europe on matters 
concerning cross-border insolvencies, or legislate to deal with changes so the UK 
can continue to operate consistently with the EU. It should be a priority for the UK 
to take all measures possible to ensure that as far as possible its recognition status 
remained intact. 
The Rule of Law and the Implications of Path Dependency  
Prior to the EIR the process of implementing cross-border insolvency suffered a 
setback on issues concerning the recognition of proceedings and the enforcement of 
those decisions.58 While the EIR facilitated cross-border economic activity, the way 
in which such proceedings operated in the different countries’ insolvency systems 
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had in many ways been the root of the struggle.59 Depending on the country that 
initiates insolvency proceedings, the outcome in relation to the creditors interests 
could vary considerably. The practice of forum shopping has already been 
mentioned above and is considered to be undesirable since it encourages certain 
jurisdictions to market themselves at the cost of member states. With the EU seeing 
a rise in the amount of companies that are going insolvent it is imperative that 
companies and creditors are seen to be getting a fair deal irrespective of where the 
insolvency proceedings are initiated. 
In response to forum shopping there have been a number of academic reports that 
have examined domestic insolvency frameworks to determine what legal principles 
could be harmonised.60 At this stage, it is imperative to note that harmonisation can 
appear in many different forms. To discuss all of the different types of harmonisation 
is beyond the scope of this article, but it suffices to mention that any attempt to 
achieve complete harmonisation is likely to be impossible given the different 
national legal orders evident across the member states. But it should also be noted 
that even something resembling partial harmonisation will also face a number of 
barriers as there would be a need for some member states to relinquish its preferred 
insolvency approach, an outcome that could lead to a lack of cooperation amongst 
the states who would be required to adopt substantive change.61  
To that end, the extent of change required could prove to be the challenge for some 
member states that have legal systems that are highly path dependent on national 
customs and practices.62 To endorse substantive change that is contrary to its existing 
insolvency framework could be construed as being one of the fundamental barriers 
to achieving the intentions as set out in both the EIR and the EIR Recast.63 The 
concept of path dependency is not based on a voluntary preference towards a 
particular trait or character evident within an insolvency model but it is often the 
result of following the historical development of a legal system that has since 
become its norm. In other words, there would be a considerable lack of choice for 
the legislators to direct an insolvency model in a way that would be different from 
what has developed within the legal parameters of a particular jurisdiction. An 
attempt to implement change would be difficult to achieve as the tendency to rely on 
traditional principles runs deeply within a legal framework such that the differences 
between insolvency theory, especially in regards to being creditor or debtor focused, 
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would remain even if the reasons for those differences no longer exist.64  Hence, 
insolvency regimes such as the ones present in Europe demonstrate how similar 
concepts can be interpreted differently, and for a jurisdiction to choose one model 
over the other in these situations is prevented by a sense of belonging to one system 
as opposed to another.65 As such, any change that leads to a member state rewriting 
its legal texts would often face resistance. To assume that the reason for this is merely 
administrative would be to misunderstand the significance that path dependency has 
on a jurisdiction. Path dependency often results in a considerable lack of flexibility 
for the legislators to transplant any cultural, historical, or legal philosophies in a way 
that is in contrast to the existing legal framework.66 While legal differences can 
distinguish between different forms of application, it can also be deliberately created 
for the purpose of gaining a competitive advantage over the other member states in 
the EU.67 While creating favourable insolvency conditions for creditors may be 
intended to encourage investment, it could also encourage forum shopping as debtors 
are likely to take advantage of insolvency laws in other countries to fulfil their own 
objectives.68  
For member states, the need to remain competitive and knowing when to embrace 
change is difficult.  While path dependency may create barriers to change, partial 
harmonisation of cross-border insolvency laws appears to offer a pragmatic step 
towards reducing some of the legal differences, while respecting national laws. 
However, this position has been made particularly difficult when the traditional 
views on cross-border theory are reviewed. Both territorialist and universalist 
approaches to insolvency law offer valuable but contrasting views on how cross-
border laws should be implemented.69  
In response to this difficulty, a closer inspection of the original draft EIR reveals a 
willingness to embrace the diverse and occasionally opposing principles and 
philosophies of these two approaches, and as such the EIR in its original form is 
generally agreed to be the start of a comprehensive European legal order in 
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insolvency law.70 The EIR’s biggest task was to determine how it was going to 
effectively deal with complex international insolvencies.71 The limitations on 
domestic solutions to resolve cross-border insolvencies was and continues to be a 
major concern as the proceedings are not always confined within territorial borders.72 
To deal with cross-border insolvencies the EIR had to be ambitious in its objective 
and scope. To that end, the EIR’s overriding objective was to create a uniform body 
of law that would be applicable to all of the member states. However, despite a legal 
framework being provided, the number of procedural conflicts between member 
states continued to be high.73 These procedural challenges, were and persist to be 
considered as part of the cross-border reality due to the influx of business activities 
being implemented across national boundaries.74 To accommodate the differences 
that could arise from cross-border procedures, an up-to-date and transparent set of 
legal rules was required which would promote cooperation and compromise; an 
approach that has traditionally had strong support amongst the judiciary.75  
While the judiciary has often demonstrated understanding of the importance of 
cooperation, it has unfortunately not been a strong trait that has been evident across 
the member states. This was particularly evident in the first legislative attempt at 
addressing the cross-border issue which collapsed at the last moment due to political 
and trading reasons.76 Despite this setback, the essence of the 1996 EC Convention 
remained sound and simply laid dormant until the political and trading divisions 
were subdued.77 Predictions that the Convention would be revived in some manner 
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proved correct when the EIR was developed.78 Notwithstanding the political fallout, 
the development of EIR acted as a reminder that member states would, given the 
circumstances, promote their own interests over that of the collective good. While 
the Regulation does not aim to harmonise national approaches to insolvency matters, 
it was believed that an international approach that would confine its reach to the 
opening and recognition of insolvency proceedings in the member states would be a 
worthwhile and achievable goal.79 To achieve this objective a strong emphasis was 
placed on cooperation between member states within the EIR and that this objective 
should be promoted heavily given that insolvency has far reaching consequences on 
society as a whole, across all member states.80  
As the volume of complex international insolvency matters continue to increase, so 
have the challenges that member states face. In response, the European Commission 
and the European Parliament have in recent years been keen to consider the 
possibility of harmonising aspects of domestic insolvency laws, or at least test the 
viability of such an ambitious project.81  
The Commission’s Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union 2015,82 is an 
example of how the EU seeks to address the critical role that strong capital markets 
have in providing sources of funding for businesses, as well as the role of insolvency 
law in contributing to this process. Amongst the key themes of this action plan was 
the desire to facilitate cross-border investment, in particular reviewing legal certainty 
and the market structure for cross-border investing, as well as working with member 
states to resolve unjustified national barriers to the free moment of capital stemming 
from insufficient implementation or lack of convergence in interpretation of a single 
rulebook. It is this latter issue that has been singled out as hindering a well-
functioning capital market union across Europe, and this could be overcome if 
national barriers were dissolved and a convergence of corporate insolvency and 
restructuring proceedings initiated.  
It is thought that if the path dependent obstacles could be reduced then there would 
be less divergence of national insolvency frameworks, which should lead to less 
dislocation in local and national communities throughout the EU.83 This position 
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could also lead to other benefits such as securing predictability of outcomes of 
judicial proceedings.84 Whether the realisation of these aims would mark the start of 
a single EU cross-border insolvency model remains to be seen, but before any act to 
harmonise the domestic insolvency laws are taken there must be a clear justification 
for convergence. It should not be done merely for the sake of it. 
Cross-border Insolvency: Theory and Approaches  
The reconciliation of legal differences across the member states has and continues 
to be a troublesome affair. However, where compromise has been reached member 
states have achieved greater success in addressing international insolvency through 
the adoption of uniform laws that give recognition to insolvency proceedings and to 
insolvency representatives.85 Part of its success has been by focusing on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign proceedings and the coordination and 
cooperation between concurrent proceedings, rather than attempting to introduce 
strict agreements as to how they should be undertaken.86 
The purpose of developing uniform recognition rules was to create a system based 
on common rules of mutuality that promoted an open channel of communication 
between the member states.87 By harmonising aspects of international law it was 
thought that if the members developed a recognised uniform insolvency law, 
investors and creditors would not waste resources and time examining and 
interpreting the laws of each individual nation.88 It would instead likely produce a 
speedier system that would result in a larger estate for distribution among the 
creditors’ of an insolvency estate as a whole.89 To this end, one of the main purposes 
of insolvency law was realised. 
The extent to which common ground can be found often leads to a tendency to 
emphasise, invest, or invent key legal concepts, which have the unfortunate effect of 
introducing “different shades of meaning so that a further element of bewilderment 
enters the debate”.90 The danger of trying to find common ground when perhaps one 
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does not exist can creates a false impression as to the extent that common principles 
do exist. Similarly, if differences are identified it is important to realise that common 
insolvency principles could be viewed differently depending on how the specific 
jurisdiction construes the procedure in question. This position could be explained by 
the concept of path dependency, where a jurisdiction’s interpretation of an 
insolvency procedure will be influenced by reading it in context with its own national 
doctrines and laws. Despite these difficulties in creating a uniformed law, it can be 
said that the pursuit of such an ambitious plan has been “necessitated by the special 
qualities of insolvency itself”.91 As such, cross-border insolvency law takes into 
consideration the obstacle of national laws and has as a result limited the scope of 
its harmonisation to dealing with only a few legal principles.92 
The Approaches: Territoriality and Universalism 
Cross-border insolvency disputes involve three main issues that must be determined. 
First, which court has jurisdiction over a cross-border insolvency case; second, 
which substantive insolvency law applies to the case; and third, whether the 
judgment opening an insolvency proceeding rendered by a foreign court should be 
recognised and, if so, whether the effects of this proceeding under foreign law should 
be extended to the assets located in the jurisdiction recognising the foreign 
judgement. Depending on the approach taken, alternative outcomes would be 
possible. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to cross-border insolvency: 
territorialism and universalism.  
Territorialism involves a jurisdiction that applies its own substantive insolvency law 
without any regard for foreign elements. The approach does not recognise any 
extraterritorial dimension to an insolvency administration, only the law of the 
country where the company resides. The assets within the jurisdiction are realised 
for the benefit of satisfying the interests of local creditors. As a result, creditors will 
have to file their claims in each jurisdiction in which insolvency proceedings are 
opened raising the possibility of several proceedings co-existing simultaneously, 
each with diverging distributive rules.93  
Universalism, on the other hand favours the concept of unity. It is a contrast to 
territorialism as it promotes the extension of jurisdiction to cover all of the assets of 
the debtor, where that is to be determined, leading to a single insolvency proceeding. 
The approach may be regarded as “idealistic”,94 but its appeal is in the requirement 
that the creditor only has to file his or her claim once, that being with the main 
                                                 
91 I F Fletcher, ‘The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-law Provisions’ 
(1998) 33 Tex Intl LJ 121. 
92 See Keay (n 2) 81. 
93 For a discussion on territorialism and universalism, see Mevorach (n 6); G McCormack, ‘Universalism 
in Insolvency Proceedings and the Common Law’ (2012) 32(2) OJLS 325. 
94 I F Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 12. 
    
proceedings. This would lead to a single set of destructive rules as promoted by the 
jurisdiction where the main proceedings have been opened.95  
Shaping Cross-border Insolvency Law: the Influence of the Two Approaches 
Theoretically, universalism is ideal for the purposes of international cooperation,96 
but while the approach has near unanimous support, it has not always been favoured 
by some policy makers.97 There were a variety of reasons why universalism was 
overlooked, with the path-dependency argument making a strong case against any 
drastic change that would go against a jurisdiction’s cultural, historical, and legal 
customs. It dictated that any attempt to harmonise insolvency law98 would strike at 
the “deep-seated cultural differences and the legal codes founded on quite different 
principles”.99 While national laws have posed problems for harmonisation projects, 
the extent to which path-dependency can derail any harmonisation goal has become 
a focal point.100 The present view is that such barriers are not as impregnable as they 
were once considered, leaving the door open for a wider universal approach to be 
adopted. 
To that end, identifying specific legal principles that could be harmonised has in 
recent years has led to a gradual merging of the universalist and territorial 
approaches in practice, even if this has been in a reduced capacity.101 However, this 
is not to say that the procedures have now been simplified. At the point at which 
Brexit occurs, the UK would have to do more than simply incorporate aspects of EU 
law into its domestic law, since procedural disparities would continue to exist. This 
would be the natural result of attempting to harmonise practices, as the task of 
finding similarities would also involve highlighting legal differences. In turn this 
would create the possibility for existing procedures to evolve into new frameworks 
that reflect the new circumstances.   
Disparities can therefore cause, rather than prevent change. However, the extent to 
which this occurs needs to be put into context. First, the method employed in relation 
to the substantive rules of a particular jurisdiction will not be compatible unless the 
jurisdiction develops its laws to comply with the universal approach. Second, 
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territorial distinctions will continue to act as national barriers therefore the logical 
conclusion would be to remove that barrier so the first point could be achieved. 
Third, if there was an unwillingness to comply with the first and second point, then 
a two tier system could come into force whereby the national laws will apply to the 
extent the issues are territorial, but would give way to the universal approach if the 
issue became extraterritorial. On this basis the position with the EIR Recast is clear. 
The EU’s policy embraces both a national and universal approach depending on the 
specific insolvency principle in question. Cross-border insolvency law is therefore 
designed to be flexible in embracing national and universal laws with the purpose of 
reducing disagreements and to actively encourage compromise between states. 
Notwithstanding the recent developments aimed at encouraging harmonisation,102 
member states have shown an unwillingness to compromise and have laws which 
may conflict with their own or encroach on their sovereignty.103 As such, resistance 
to harmonisation should not be seen as an act that is beyond the norm. Harmonisation 
has the potential to discriminate against lesser-developed countries, as most 
multinational companies have their principal place of business in industrial, 
developed countries.104 Therefore, adopting a universalist approach would likely 
lead to the laws of developed countries displacing the laws of those that are either 
under-developed in terms of international business operations, or lacking the 
recognition of being a regional financial and transactional hub within the area.105  
While such a concern has not had an impact on the UK, over time Brexit has the 
potential to limit the UK’s ability to influence developments within the EU cross-
border insolvency framework. As such, the UK’s support for universalism would be 
dependent on whether the remaining member states would continue to accommodate 
the UK’s approach to cross-border insolvencies. Since this position is unlikely, 
attention has turned to the other theories of modified universalism and co-operative 
territoriality.106  
Modified universalism107 is best described as the most workable system for cross-
border cooperation as it lacks the rigid requirements of universalism, in particular 
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the demand for foreign recognition.108 However, despite its relaxed approach that 
could aid international texts, not all insolvency regimes have undertaken this 
approach, as evident in the response to the EIR,109 and also the European 
Commission’s 2014 Recommendations.110  
While the EIR may have been categorised as a universalist text,111 it was in fact a 
hybrid model combining both universalism and territorialism.112 This was evident in 
how main proceedings could be initiated but allowed for secondary, or territorial 
proceedings in member states where the debtors’ assets were situated.113 However if 
secondary proceedings had been omitted from the text, and a strictly modified 
universalist approach followed, there would have been a possibility that the EIR’s 
prospects for success would have been greatly enhanced. This approach would have 
permitted the EIR to further its universalist objective of forming an unified 
administration of assets while at the same time maintaining a level of flexibility that 
would permit it to work within the current “multi-forum, multi-law” business 
world.114  
Such a world could include the UK’s post-Brexit position, since it would likely 
present cross-border insolvency laws as a complex legal field that is overwhelmed 
and undermined by the availability of the cross-border secondary proceedings. 
However, this may not necessarily be the case since there exists a precondition in 
which an “establishment” must be identified before such proceedings could be 
brought in that jurisdiction.115 The opening of secondary proceedings were designed 
to act as a measure to ensure that the cross-border nature of primary proceedings 
were workable, while critically establishing policies and procedures that left room 
for differences.116 The scope of flexibility that this afforded brought success in 
fostering cooperation since the member states were not coerced into a position that 
was contrary to their legal standing.117  
To this end, should a member state lack choice in implementing laws that are 
contrary to its national laws, the member state would likely find a way to influence 
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the extent in which it would apply. For example, a wide interpretation on the  
procedural requirements could be taken to reach a less restrictive approach, which 
subsequently could undermine the EIR’s universalist goals.118 To manage the 
potential danger of non-compliance, such as what was seen with the European 
Commission’s 2014 recommendations, an inclusive approach that benefits all 
member states would be required.  
Harmonisation of Substantive Insolvency Law 
The pursuit towards harmonising substantive insolvency law across the member 
states has gained momentum over the last few years. A key turning point was the 
recommendations put forward by the European Commission in its 2014 report 
entitled on a new approach to business failure and insolvency,119 which proposed to 
restructure frameworks across EU member states. The objective was put on the 
Commission’s agenda for 2016 which, in addition, recommended that protection 
should be provided to the providers of new finance.  
This latter recommendation was part of wider efforts put forward in the 2015 
Commission’s Capital Markets Union Action Plan.120 This proposed a Directive to 
be developed in three key areas, namely: common principles on the use of early 
restructuring frameworks; rules to allow entrepreneurs to benefit from a second 
chance; and finally produce targeted measures for member states to increase the 
efficiency of insolvency, restructuring and discharge procedures.121 Since the 
recommendations were published the Commission noted that they had only been 
implemented partially by the member states. The low up-take was attributed to the 
divergent national insolvency laws, and member states being concerned about the 
uncertainty as to who owns secured assets and whose rights take precedence in the 
event of a default. The pursuit of harmonisation it seemed had hampered the timely 
restructuring of viable companies in financial distress, and with it form a barrier to 
the free flow of capital. It is fortunate that despite the issues in other member states 
the UK has advanced restructuring laws that are not too dissimilar to the model that 
the Commission wants to promote. This would mean that the UK’s position on cross-
border insolvencies post-Brexit will not be too far removed to what already exists in 
the EU.  
Recommendations  
While there are still a number of uncertainties on the exact course that the UK’s 
cross-border insolvency regime will take, it does present some foreseeable issues 
that would need to be addressed. In terms of protecting the UK’s commercial and 
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financial position after Brexit, it would be paramount to ensure that the UK continues 
to have some input in the shaping of cross-border insolvency laws. To that end, any 
future reform would do well to consider the following issues.   
Protecting the UK’s Automatic Recognition  
In considering the threats that the UK could face following Brexit, the loss of its 
automatic recognition would be the most critical. If foreign jurisdictions did not 
provide the UK with recognition to those cases that operate outside of its jurisdiction, 
the UK’s ability to effectively deal with cross-border insolvencies would be greatly 
diminished. To address this, the dynamics between the UK and the EU would have 
to be explored to determine whether the inclusion of the UK is what makes the cross-
border insolvency laws successful. Should it be determined that a cross-border law 
would be enhanced with the UK included in the model, then this would be highly 
likely to encourage the EU to take measures to ensure that the present position is 
maintained. Should the existing laws not simply be extended to have application 
after Brexit, it seems quite possible that the benefits of the EU Regulation could be 
preserved in negotiations via an equivalent treaty between the UK and the EU.  
The extent of the treaty, should one be required, would depend on whether a “soft” 
or “hard” Brexit is realised. Recent negotiations with the EU suggest that the soft 
version of Brexit is highly likely, although this is subject to change as the 
negotiations continue with the trade deals and concessions.122  
Expanding on the Brussels Recast Regulation  
To maintain its current position, the UK could consider entering into a similar 
agreement to Recast Brussels Regulation, which regulates jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments between EU member states.123 This 
option would depend on how the Recast Brussels Regulation and the EIR Recast 
are viewed, with some cases indicating that they are mutually exclusive 
instruments acting harmoniously together.124 In practice, a broad interpretation to 
“civil and commercial” matters in the Brussels Recast Regulation has often been 
given but it has previously been suggested that the jurisdictional scope of the EIR 
(and now the EIR Recast) “should not be broadly interpreted”.125 That said, the 
CJEU has viewed the notion of insolvency-related actions in a fairly broad light 
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causing further confusion as to what would be the correct approach on this 
matter.126 Expanding the Recast Brussels Regulation remains an option, but it will 
be subject to how this is viewed on the international scene. Given the uncertainty 
of Brexit, it would be highly unlikely that the UK would want to adopt any 
measures that would only add to the confusion of its position.  
The Lugano Convention Pledge  
An interesting option would be for the UK to join the “Lugano Convention 2007”, 
which imposes a similar regime to the Brussels Recast Regulation in relation to 
recognition and enforcement (in civil and commercial matters) of judgments 
between EU Members States, Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway. However, there are 
some limitations with the Lugano Convention since it would not apply to tax, 
customs and administrative matters or to the status and legal capacity of natural 
persons, rights in property arising out of matrimonial relationships, wills and 
succession, bankruptcy or composition, social security or arbitration. While the 
limitations may appear too extensive, the Convention’s importance is realised in its 
ability to facilitate the mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments handed 
down by the national courts of the EU member states and those of the countries 
named above. While it offers a replacement for the Recast Brussels Regulations, the 
UK would have to be mindful that the process of joining would likely take at least 
12 months,127 as it could trigger a lengthy negotiation process with the signatories, 
who all have to agree.128  
Widen the Scope to Include further Designated Countries 
Referring back to the law that already exists in the UK, the UK could look to expand 
section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986 to include further designated countries129 
(perhaps all EU member states) to widen its scope, or as a radical alternative, 
dispense with the requirement for designation altogether.130 The latter option could 
only be achieved if a number of steps were taken, such as to dilute the "duty" to act 
in response to a section 426 request (which is far from being an absolute duty in any 
event)131 and make relief discretionary. To this, extending the designated countries 
would only be workable if wide discretion was afforded to section 426, and that there 
was nothing unacceptably discriminatory or otherwise contrary to public policy in 
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the country’s insolvency provisions.132 Should a flexible approach not be adopted 
there would be a danger that section 426 would be narrowly construed and as such 
be of limited value to the UK as an option post-Brexit.  
Would a New Restructuring Law be Desirable Post-Brexit? 
As a last resort, or as a radical new alternative to the existing legal framework, the 
UK could take the opportunity to rethink its cross-border insolvency approach and 
create a new restructuring law akin to the US Chapter 11. Chapter 11, given its 
extensive influence,133 has long since been considered a desirable model for 
European restructuring laws.134 This can be seen in the similarities that are evident 
between Chapter 11 and the European Commission’s proposed European 
restructuring directive,135 the proposal of which is firmly anchored in the Capital 
Markets Union project.136 Whether the UK would opt to redesign its restructuring 
laws would depend on how effective its scheme of arrangement remains after Brexit. 
Since Chapter 11 is very similar to the scheme of arrangement, the question would 
be whether it would be more beneficial to amend the scheme to achieve the desired 
result. In addition, the UK would have to appreciate that Chapter 11 has its own 
complications since it does not always operate as intended given the rise of business 
sales in the US, and also Chapter 11 depends on specialist courts, something which 
the UK does not have. 
Should the UK consider that it would not be suitable to endorse aspects of the US 
bankruptcy regime it could simply align its existing laws to reflect what the current 
cross-border insolvency laws are at the point of Brexit. On this basis, automatic 
recognition from the other member states would be crucial to give credibility to the 
UK’s redesigned cross-border law. Therefore, to encourage the member states to 
accept the UK’s model it would likely have to look similar to EIR Recast. However, 
while a sense of familiarity could be achieved, the UK would be wise to take the 
opportunity to deal with some of the increased complexities137 evident in EIR Recast 
and tighten the scope around the EIR Recast which has the potential to lead to 
inflexible results which subvert the establishment of a rescue-friendly culture.138 
With such restrictions relaxed it would be likely that the UK’s redeveloped 
restructuring model would appeal to businesses and creditors alike.  
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Conclusion  
Brexit presents an unprecedented situation within the EU that will challenge the way 
that cross-border insolvencies are undertaken. When the UK leaves the EU it remains 
unclear as to what laws will continue to apply, and what laws would need to be 
adopted to ensure that the UK can effectively deal with cross-border insolvencies. 
Before Brexit occurs the UK needs to decide what its response should be – to attempt 
to maintain the status quo, or to see Brexit as an opportunity to redesign its cross-
border insolvency rules.  
The answer to this question it will depend on whether the UK has a choice in the 
matter, or whether that decision would be made on its behalf. The extent to which 
change will occur is unlikely to be known for some time since the UK continues to 
negotiate the finer details of its exit plan. Should the EIR Recast continue to apply it 
would be because it has been mutually decided by the UK and the EU that it would 
be in their best interests. An important factor that is likely to influence this decision 
would be the need to maintain predictable outcomes in cross-border insolvencies so 
that creditors can be reassured about their rights, and in turn encouraged to invest in 
businesses.  
While Brexit will provide many challenges to the UK, the loss of its automatic 
recognition could potentially have dire consequences in its ability to remain a key 
player in European cross-border insolvency law. Whether the UK decides to enact a 
law to take into account EIR Recast or it decides to expand on section 426 remains 
to be seen. Given the ease in which the former option could be achieved it is likely 
that this would be preferred, especially since it would build on the existing judge-
made decisions that are integrated in the UK’s common law. Any ambitious plan for 
the UK to rewrite its approach to cross-border insolvencies would likely struggle to 
amount to anything different to what already currently applies given the role that 
path dependency plays.  
Ultimately, given the complexities that Brexit is likely to raise, the extent of the 
challenges would depend on the legal and political climate that the UK finds itself 
in when the negotiations have been completed. Until then, the questions need to 
continue. 
 
 
